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The games must go on – but without Karl Schranz: Sapporo 1972 Games Controversy and the Question Olympic Amateurism

> *"Remember Avery Brundage? Remember the International Olympic Committee? That's the bemedaled group of ageing dukes, tycoons, former kings and African generals who brought you the wonderful worlds of Karl Schranz, Jim Thorpe and the overlooked track shoe payments at Mexico City."*
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> - *Ski* Magazine, January 1975, 4.

Introduction

This article examines the question of Olympic amateurism by focusing on the barring of Austrian alpine skier Karl Schranz in the Sapporo games in 1972. It will be argued that the disqualification cannot be properly understood without taking into account the schism between the International

Olympic Committee (hereafter IOC) and its long-serving President Avery Brundage on the one hand and the International Ski Federation (hereafter FIS) and its long-serving President Marc Hodler on the other. The hostility between the two organizations which culminated at Sapporo will be examined through media representations of the IOC-FIS relationship in the USA and more mainstream international media (in Finland, the USA and Great Britain). The focus will be on how the media portrayed the IOC and its devotion to the amateurism. In so far as the Schranz incident has been examined through press discourses, understandably focus has mainly been on German-speaking and European press.[1] However, by 1972 when Schranz was banned from the Sapporo games, he was widely-known figure and considered as the best skier of his time in North America as well as in Europe. Thus the popular image of ski racing was often funneled through him – an instance which makes it sensible to put him in the spotlight of the IOC-FIS acrimony.

The question of Olympic amateurism has a rich body literature which needs not to be reiterated here. Summing the current historical wisdom Matthew P. Llewlyn and John Gleaves have recently argued that the Olympic movement's view over amateurism run counter to its own core philosophy and values, such as equal opportunities for all people and all nations. At the same time, they continue, "the IOC's promotion and preservation of amateurism reads as exclusionary, elitist, and racists."[2] According to Robert Morford, the conflict between the reality of modern sport system and the IOC's obstinate adherence to the ideology of Olympisim "created an incompatible dualism for modern sport" which was characterized by hypocrisy, essentially meaning that the Olympic movement "forced the athlete into accepting hypocrisy as a way of life."[3] As we will see, such sentiments were openly expressed in the ski media in the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, "hypocrisy", was the key narrative term defining the Schranz incident, or the "Schranz -racket" (*der Schranz-rummel*). In addition to Schranz and Sapporo 1972, it should be noted that the Canadian ice-hockey team did not even travel to Japan, protesting the IOC's anti-professional stance. The Canucks had a point: they were branded as professionals and not allowed, whereas the Czechoslovakian and Soviet teams for instance were allowed despite the fact that it was well-known that they were paid "state professionals."

In Olympic scholarship as well as within the history of skiing, Karl Schranz's dismissal is well-known.[4] In all respects, Schranz is seen as a trailblazer who contributed to the downfall of Olympic amateurism for being honest and open about money. As a *New York Times* article in 2001 put it "because Schranz paid price, others are now paid."[5] No doubt, Schranz deserves the credit he gets, as ethically speaking, he paid a high prize for his honesty. Nevertheless, such writings are hardly alive to the troubling issues of the 1970s. For one, Schranz was not the first skier who "paid the price" and similarly, the fact that he paid the price in terms of being disqualified from the games, it did not mean that he lost out financially. As it was, he was perhaps the best paid skier of his era, purportedly making around $50,000 per annum in skiing.[6] We also have to bear in mind that as a matter of fact, Schranz was not ahead of his time, as he himself claimed in the *New York Times* article, but rather the IOC was well behind of its time. The amateur rule which the IOC had given a sacred place in the Olympic movement was in the 1970s an anachronism which could not be sustained and such a state of affairs was openly discussed in the sports media, including the ski media. Although a counterfactual point, it is still very likely that if Schranz would not have become the symbol of the antiquated amateurism in 1972, it would have been someone else. Moreover, Schranz's barring in 1972 cannot be separated from the long-standing animosity between the IOC and the International Ski Federation (hereafter FIS), which in the eyes of the IOC and its long-time President Avery Brundage was a sport organization which most blatantly and openly violated the IOC view on amateurism. Above all, for Brundage, the ideal of amateurism was a sacred one, him being "an apostle of amateurism", as Allen Guttman put it. If Brudage religiously guarded amateurism, the main heretic was the FIS.[7]

FIS vs. IOC – long-standing controversy

The schism between the FIS and the IOC had been simmering a long time and the question of amateurism was at its core. Going back to 1952

when Brundage was elected as the president of the IOC, he contacted Marc Hodler the FIS president who also was the member of the IOC with the following:

> Skiing is suffering from the same difficulties that we had here in the United States with Track and Field Athletes, Swimmers, etc. twenty years ago. Every time one violation of the rules occurs and is not stopped it leads to a score of others. The manner in which we managed to prevent practices of this kind was by suspending two or three prominent athletes who were involved, some of them innocently…
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> In skiing there has been so much laxity and so much commercialization in the past that I am afraid drastic measures will be needed to stop these practices. The newspapers will not give you much publicity unless some prominent skier has been suspended. If you take this action in some of the aggravated cases it will be brought to the attention of the public and the skiing world, and if the statements that are released are carefully worded, I think most of your troubles will be over.[8]

Thus, Brundage was already in 1952 working to make examples of some "aggravated cases" to raise public awareness of commercialization of skiing. What is more, Brundage had already established a pattern, as the letter shows, that suspending prominent athletes was the way to get media attention to the issue. Twenty years after Brundage's letter, Karl Schranz felt Brundage's tactics and became the best-known skier to be barred from the Olympics, However, it is well-worth remembering that a fellow Austrian Toni Sailer, the best skier of his generation and three-time gold medalist at the 1956 Olympics had received the similar fate in 1959-60.[9] Yet, his departure from the amateur scene after his successful business ventures in film, hotel and clothing industries was less dramatic and probably did not receive the type of media attention Brundage was seeking. Additionally, in Cortina Brundage had banned Ken Henry, a U.S. speed skating star (and a winner of the 500m event at the 1952 games), from participating since he was deemed a professional golfer. However, his dismissal came after he had already competed but nevertheless, his professional golfer status would only begin in April,

months after the Olympics. The year 1956 was, by all accounts, bad for Brundage's mission on amateurism as his attempt to change the Olympic oath to include a promise by the athletes that they would not turn professional were voted down by the IOC.[10]

The conflict between the IOC and skiing was intensified in 1964 games in Innsbruck. According to Tantner, it was in Innsbruck where Brundage became increasingly annoyed with what he viewed as rampant commercialization of alpine skiing, witnessing how the winner of men's downhill skiing, the Austrian Egon Zimmermann waved his Fischer skis in front of television cameras.[11] By 1966 skiing community too had become upset about what seemed the Olympic movement's continuous harassment of alpine skiing (professional Nordic skiers did not elicit such a strong response from Brundage). Following the Finnish National Olympic Committee proposal that some summer events like weight-lifting, handball and volleyball could be transferred to the Winter Games in order to balance the schedules between the summer and winter programs, *Skiing* magazine lamented that such proposal would mean that true winter sport towns (such as Chamonix, St.Moriz, Garmisch-Partenkirchen) would not be able to host the Games anymore. If the IOC would accept the proposal, the *Skiing* magazine argued that the FIS should

> pull skiing out of the IOC completely. The IOC has always given skiers a needlessly hard time with its curious double standards – it's all right to be a state-subsidized "amateur" if you are a Communist, but it's sinful to teach skiing to get a few bucks if you are a capitalist – and maybe the time has come for a showdown. Avery Brundage would look pretty silly staging a Winter Olympics without skiing."[12]

The discourse here shows the skiing community's sense of being hunted a long time by the IOC in general and Brundage in particular. What is more, the sense of frustration was illustrated also with reference to Communist professionalism. Regarding the amateur question, the IOC was applying double-standards; it seemed far better to be a professional Communist athlete in the Eastern bloc than ski racer in the West.[13]

By the time of the Grenoble games in 1968, passions were running very high, as Llewlyn and Gleaves have reminded, the 1968 games

"marked the beginning of the end of amateurism."[14] Avery Brundage remained insolent as ever. Irritated by such commercial encroachments like ski manufacturer logos on the skis and sponsor logos on the bib, by Grenoble Brundage was determined to put a stop on skiing industry's disregard of Olympic amateurism. In Grenoble he refused to hand out medals for the alpine skiers, for "personal reasons". Above all, after the Grenoble games the view that the FIS had fooled the IOC was prevalent. In a circular, Brundage complained implicitly referring to Killy and Greene that "many alpine skiers had the impudence to brag about how they broke the Olympic rules."[15] Similarly Hugh Weir, the chair of the IOC's Eligibility Committee since 1966 wrote to Brundage that "[t]here must be no weakening [of attitude regarding amateurism] and we must not be fooled again by the FIS as we were in Grenoble."[16]

The skiing community was equally furious. Reflecting on the games in the *Skiing* magazine in October 1968, John Henry Auran spoke on behalf of many when he argued the following:

> The Olympic idea died somewhere in Grenoble, because there are limits to what the human psyche can stand in the name of belief. It will tolerate pretentiousness…up to a point…It will tolerate cupidity…up to a point…It will tolerate hypocrisy…up to a point. But there is a limit, and at the 10th Olympic Winter Games, sports in general and skiing in particular managed to surpass our capacity to believe that the Olympics were worth the trouble.[17]

After Grenoble, what was at stake was the status of alpine skiing as an Olympic sport. FIS rules on amateurism had been far more relaxed than IOC's – and thus more honest too, since the FIS allowed athletes to "take in public what they used to get under the table."[18] In 1969, Brundage proclaimed publicly that all Grenoble medalists should return the medals they've won fallaciously. Jean-Claude Killy had sold his pictures with three gold medals to the *Paris-Match* and *Skiing* magazines after which the IOC – or Brundage – asked Killy to return his medals. He refused.[19] In June 1969, the IOC conference convened in Warsaw where – to Brundage's chagrin – decided to accept Ski Federation rules of amateurism. The way how the media presented the matter was a clear defeat for Brundage: "The Inter-

national Olympic Committee rebuffed Avery Brundage […] by deciding today to continue alpine skiing in the Winter Olympics and ignoring his demands that Jean-Claude Killy […] and Nancy Greene[…] return their gold medals", wrote the *Washington Times*.[20]

However, in the IOC session in Amsterdam in May 1970, Brundage was full of vengeance. According to him, both alpine skiing and ice-hockey had no place in the Olympic family due to their professionalism. The juxtapositioning in the press of Brundage's stance on amateurism again worked to bolster a negative image of him. *The Washington Post* simply called him "the Chicago millionaire" who seeks to guard the idea of amateurism.[21] By this time Killy and Greene had retired from the amateur scene and, as a result, Schranz became to occupy the IOC's attention. According to Brundage Karl Schranz was "a living advertisement" for the ski manufacturers as his photo had appeared on the official Austrian information bulletin with his ski brand showing and in full ski uniform. The rhetoric was nothing but offensive. The *New York Times* quoted Brundage: "'There is no place in the Olympic program for a sport of such limited appeal. This poisonous cancer must be eliminated without further delay. Alpine skiing does not belong in the Olympic games,' Brundage said."[22] During the IOC session in Amsterdam the FIS and the IOC in fact worked out a compromise: the FIS eligibility rules would be used as the measure on amateurism but the FIS would enforce them more rigorously than before. Hank Kashiwa, Rick Chaffee and Schranz were immediately considered ineligible for the Sapporo games.[23]

When the United States Skiing Association (USSA) convened in its annual meeting in San Francisco in 1970, Brundage arrived too. What emerged from the reporting, was utter confusion about the rules. Rick Chaffee argued on behalf of the racers that they needed guidance how they can support themselves within existing eligibility rules. According to the *Skiing* "the [Alpine Competitions] committee listened respectfully, and then attempted to go on to other business."[24] Same questions were voiced again in the general meeting, without answers. The problem for Chaffee was that he was getting interviews from prospective employers and he needed to know which he could accept within the confines of IOC eligibility rules. The answer was to remain totally outside the ski industry.

While there was on-going uncertainty about the eligibility rules, there was nothing uncertain about Brundage's presence at the convention as John Jerome blasted

> "Ol' Ave stood up […] and told us again that we were naughty – a performance intended to strike fear into the convention body […] Brundage is a demonstrably evil man. No one has much quarrel with […] antiquated stand for pure amateurism. But Brundage uses that stand to fan political fires – all the while droning sonorously about the apolitical nature of the Games. He practices selective hypocrisy."[25]

Furthermore, the writing purported that Brundage and the IOC were fighting a losing battle. According to Jerome, Brundage's appearance was "negligible" on the outcome of the convention and the gridlock on the amateurism continued as every attempt to solve the question "came a cropper".[26] Thus, after the Amsterdam and San Francisco sessions it seemed that during 1970, the skiing circle and the IOC had settled on an uneasy compromise which did not last long. Later on in 1970 Brundage proclaimed that ten alpine skiers who had participated in the Mammoth Mountain summer camp, sponsored by American ski boot manufacturer Lange, had violated the amateur rule and would thus be banned from Sapporo games (Schranz was not on the list). After much wriggling between the IOC, the FIS and threads from the Austrian and French federations that they would not send members to Sapporo, the IOC lift the ban in its Moscow session.[27] In late 1971 Marc Hodler was musing the possibility that alpinists would not participate in the Olympics and would hold their own world championships independently. The conflicting issue this time was about the amount of training days which separated amateurs from professionals. According to the FIS, they had agreed on 160 days of training per year was allowed while Avery Brundage claimed that the number of days was between 30 and 60.[28] The fundamental question over the practice of sport thus arose: how could the athletes really take seriously the Olympic motto "citius, altius, fortius" (faster, higher, stronger) if they were not allowed to train? The hypocrisy and double-standards seemed to be the label once more. As Hart Cantelon has remarked, quite often in the amateurism question the notions of amateurism which were held by

people like Brundage, "contradicted the lived experiences of the majority of participants involved in the high-performance sport", the issue which Rick Chaffee had raised in San Francisco convention.[29]

Karl Schranz and alpine commercialism

In February 1970, the FIS alpine ski world championships took place at Val Gardena, Italy. Beyond a number of memorable sporting feats, the event was nothing but a celebration of alpine commercialism which could be felt hundreds of kilometers away from the site – in Frankfurt, in Munich, at the Innsbruck airport as well as in Geneva and Milan where Kneissel, Rossignol and Dynamic skis fought for the media space. In Val Gardena the displays were even more manifest, "Trade names. Of every product ever known to have any connection with skiing, plus some with no connection whatsoever […] on every conceivable surface that can possibly support visual indication of commercial concern…"[30] However, from the perspective of skiing community such commercialism was not deplored – it was a simple fact of professionalism and not confined to skiing alone. *Skiing* magazine called, perhaps tongue-in-cheek, the event as "the world's first professional amateur championships", since the FIS was officially complying with the IOC standards but it was obvious that the sport – like most popular sports at the time – was connected to well-crafted advertisement campaigns. Importantly, the marriage between the business and ski racing was framed in terms which worked to everybody's benefit, although the fear was that otherwise well-run and entertaining sporting event, would "wander indecisively toward some ultimate Olympic fiasco…" as the *Skiing* put it.[31]

Sports Illustrated also predicted problems for the next Olympic meet. In March 1970 it run a long article about the collision between FIS and the IOC. The article blamed the FIS for initiating the current course, whose first victims were the Americans Hank Kashiwa and Rick Chaffee, but it nevertheless praised Marc Hodler's – "attorney from Bern" – reasonable stance against Brundage: "I told Avery", the FIS ski boss was quoted, "that if we could control the manufacturers' temptations by having them go legally through our national federations, we might do away with much of the hy-

pocrisy that has plagued us". However, as the paper noted, "Avery Brundage was not greatly moved by either the truth or the beauty of Marc Hodler's plea."[32] The essence of the 1969 FIS attempt to manage the manufacturers commercial interests and the racers need to remain "amateurs" was the creation of national ski pools. However, how such system worked in practice was left to the national federations, with mixed results, as Andrés Mercé Varela complained in the *Olympic Review* in 1971.[33] Thus national federations would direct and control their athletes' money flows, honestly and over the table. In the same article Bob Lange, the owner of the revolutionary Lange ski boot company, was interviewed. According to him, in Grenoble he had paid no one, not even Karl Schranz, to use his boots, but at the turn of the decade the attitude had changed. One can only imagine what Brundage, who continuously monitored the press about amateur issues was feeling if he ever red Lange's words:

> Now, of course, you have no guarantee that there'll be anybody using your equipment unless you pay the price. The basic price for a fairly good male skier on a boot is $2,500, plus prize money. There is a base of about $750 for first place, $500 for second, $300 for third. Some—like Schranz—cost a lot more. I remember I offered Karl $5,000 in Waterville Valley last year. He said, 'I like your product and I'd like to, but....' I offered him a hair more than the $5,000, but, no, he went back to his old company again for a lot more. We pay something like 30 different guys.[34]

The last word in the article was left for the Dr. Amos R. Little, the US delegate to the FIS. Although he was critical about the actions of the FIS in the sense that it had passed the bucket to national federations on issues such as eligibility whereas it should have rested under the FIS' discretion, the basic problem was – nevertheless – the IOC. The FIS was afraid of the IOC action if it was totally open about racing. "It looks like a confrontation is inevitable" Little argued and continued to note that "I really don't think we should try to avoid it any longer", while at the same time he acknowledged that he did not know what to do, "except there's no point in letting all this hypocrisy go on."[35] In Val Gardena Karl Schranz won the gold medal in giant slalom – the last world champion-

ship medal he ever got. The 1971 season was not particularly successful for Schranz and as the Sapporo games approached, it was obvious that it was his last chance for the Olympic victory.

Coming to the 1971–1972 season, the hypocrisy and animosity continued, as no solutions to the deadlocked question over amateurism was found. Brundage from his part, continued with his own mission. On the eve of the Kitzbühel downhill race in January 1972, which Schranz won, the IOC gave an ultimatum stating that every athlete who displayed the Evian label on the race bib would be barred from Sapporo. Evian, astonished by such encroachment, proclaimed that such stance was ridiculous because the deal was between the race organizers and the mineral water manufacturer. No competitor would gain anything from the advertisement on the bib.[36] In Sestrier, Italy, Brundage complained that again, bibs were used for advertisement and especially Austrian and French racers were nothing else than side offices of the tourist industry. The situation was ready to explode in Sapporo and the man who ignited the keg was Karl Schranz.[37]

Hypocrisy of all times: The press discourse on barring Karl Schranz

Many great skiers, like Toni Sailer, Hank Kashiwa, Rick Chaffee and Nancy Greene, to name but a few had basically fell victim to the IOC's stringent rules on amateurism. So why it was Karl Schranz's disqualification from Sapporo that really stood out among the other cases? Naturally, the timing was important as was the culmination of the drama which had been going on since the 1960s, with Schranz always featuring in the argument. On 27 January 1972, only days from the opening ceremony of the games Schranz took on an issue of professionalism with the IOC in general and Avery Brundage in particular, offering the fuel to the flames which had been burning for the last several seasons: "If Mr. Brundage had been poor as I was and many other athletes", the Austrian went on to note,

> I wonder if he wouldn't have a different attitude…If we followed Mr. Brundage's recommendations to their true end, then the Olympics would be a competition only for the very rich. No man of ordinary means could ever afford to excel in his sport… This thing of amateur purity is something that dates back to the

> 19th century when amateur sportsmen were regarded as gentlemen and everyone else was an outcast. The Olympics should be a competition of skill and strength and speed, no more.[38]

Apart from criticizing the IOC, Schranz also injected a good dose of class consciousness into the Olympic spirit. Schranz himself originated from a poor working-class family and his father died of tuberculosis contracted from inhaling the soot in the railway tunnels.[39] Schranz had a clear sense of being poor and being rich which he added to his own Olympic discourse: "It's one thing to be born rich and another to be born poor…but in the Olympics, I think all should be given an equal chance."[40] In fairness to Schranz, he said out loud what the majority of athletes felt at the time – and had been feeling a long time. However, as has been pointed in previous research, Schranz probably overestimated the protection and solidarity that the FIS, national committees, other athletes and the media would offer. Had he been aware the long list of athletes that Brundage had barred from the Olympics, he might have been more cautious and at least waited after the games were over.[41]

Following Schranz's comments, on 31 January, the IOC decided in its meeting, by vote 28-14, that Schranz would be barred from the games since he had openly and with full recognition violated the eligibility rule. The further indictment was Schranz's outspoken criticism against the IOC. The ruling caused a brief storm of global criticism against the IOC where public opinion was overwhelmingly on Schranz's side. In Austria, Brundage became "the enemy of the state number one."[42] In Finland, the leading national newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat*, labled Schranz as the victim of the IOC despotism since the committee had not even given Schranz a chance to defend himself before the judgment.[43] The paper's columnist wrote that Schranz was simply a martyr of Olympic politics and the FIS did not consider him professional. The endnote, however was telling: "Currently the Olympic movement puts athletes into three categories: amateurs, non-amateurs and professionals. More honest categorization would be 1) professionals, and 2) liars."[44] The days after Schranz was dismissed, the British paper *Observer* wrote that Schranz had paid a heavy prize for his honesty and the IOC had lost all the respect of the fellow competitors.[45] According to *Skiing*, "Karli's"

only sin was his refusal to be a hypocrite.[46] Another American magazine, *Ski*, mused that behind the scenes Brundage had plans to expel far greater number of skiers but could not do so without damaging the games in which the Japanese (and the NBC broadcasting company) had invested so much.[47]

What the framing of the situation reveal, is that hardly any paper took the IOC's and Brundage's mission on the one hand to uphold the virtues of amateurism seriously and on the other to fight against commercialism in sport. The *Helsingin Sanomat* editorial called for a general democratization of the Olympic movement and renewal of its spirit since it had fulfilled its original "romantic mission". The editorial also laid at least a proportion of the blame on national Olympic committees and athletes themselves who had begun to make mockery of the Olympic traditions and testing the patience of the IOC.[48] Yet, such newspaper discourse did not automatically mean that all the readers of magazines such as *Skiing* or *Ski* subscribed to their ideas. One angry reader of *Skiing* complained that the paper's framing was misleading since "most of the American skiing public upholds the ideals of amateur competition, and your failure to do so is a disservice to skiing and athletic competition."[49] In addition, one of the very few journalists who was not troubled with the events was the *New York Times* sport columnist Arthur Daley, who was known for his hatred of the winter Olympics. He noted that the whole affair ended in compromise: the IOC could have sent most skiers packing, but did not for the fact that it would have ruined the games for the Japanese and the NBC, as noted above. Instead, Schranz was sent home "to count his money", Daley noted, continuing that it "will take a long time because this high-priced amateur has so much of it."[50]

However, when it came to defend amateurism as an old Olympic idea, only socialist and pro-Communist papers took the pro-Brundage stance. A case in point is the Soviet propaganda magazine aimed at readers in the capitalistic bloc, the *Soviet Sport*. According to the magazine, the Schranz-controversy received so much coverage in the world's press because it became a symbol which exposed "the shady deals by businessmen who have long been waging an offensive against amateur sport." According to the magazine, "the ultimate aim" of the capitalistic system was to reach a "marriage of convenience" in which business-

men unscrupulously take advantage of the champions to advertise their products. The magazine did not illustrate such an argument with a single case, but claimed that there was a systematic "penetration" in a large scale where "businessmen are literally diving into sport". The situation was most obvious in the alpine sport, and as the *Soviet Sport* went on to claim, the IOC "was compelled to take action". The *Soviet sport* offered staunch support for the IOC as especially within the realm of alpine skiing, which probably in the Soviet eyes was the most glaring manifestation of capitalistic sport industry, was "totally incompatible with amateur status". Going back to Jean-Claude Killy, the publication claimed that after his three gold medals in Grenoble, he had "made between five and six million francs from advertisements".

Referring to the Danish IOC member Ivar Emil Vind, the *Soviet Sport* blamed the FIS for this alarming situation as their rules were so relaxed. In addition, "the businessmen" got the blame again for their know-how of how to exploit both, the financial difficulties of federations and athletes. Individuals such as Schranz were not explicitly blamed but "encroachment of business" was. The sports community was disturbed by all these developments, since "the spirit of commercialism is alien to the Olympic spirit" and the "intrigues" of businessmen "have nothing to do with the Olympic movement." So, unsurprisingly, on the face of massive media onslaught against Brundage, and the whole antiquated Olympic movement, its most vigorous defense came from the Soviet Union which directly benefitted from the double-standards which the IOC had implemented since the 1950s. The fact that Brundage himself was not only American but also a millionaire businessman who had made a fortune in the capitalistic system did not elicit any criticism. In the later issue, the same publication wrote how "big business was on the offensive", especially referring to the American model of sport, where commercialism and sports welded into a complex social system. The message was the same again; the principles of the Olympic movement were put into jeopardy by the American and West-European capitalistic systems.

Finally, with reference to the dismissal of Schranz, the media discourse also shows that the much cherished idea of Olympic spirit among competitors themselves was in short supply too. As Schranz was dis-

missed, there was an initial wave of sympathy. At home in Austria, the citizens demanded – and the Austrian National Olympic Committee considered – that the whole team would fly home in support of Schranz. The fact that the team remained in Sapporo had nothing to do with Schranz's plea that they stay on and compete. The team would have remained in Japan without the plea too. Although symbolically Schranz had taken the burden of professionalism on his shouldres, virtually no other skier in Sapporo came to his defense. Simply, most of them were probably afraid to draw attention to themselves, after the IOC had found one scapegoat. As Al Greenberg wrote in *Skiing*, had Schranz been more popular on the race circuit, the other competitors might have hit an Olympic strike, especially since the FIS had promised (the promise was not upheld) to organize World Championships in 1972 if Schranz wanted. After all, Gustavo Thoeni's and Patrick Russel's sponsorships with Spalding-Persenico and Rossignol were equally known as Schranz's arrangement with Kneissl.[51] However, German skier Franz Vogler, quoted in the Finnish paper, captured much of the other racers sentiment when he said that he did not care what happened to Schranz. He himself had earlier been injured, missing the 1970 World Championships and now he was only concentrating on his own performance.[52]

Although it might have been one thing for competitors from other countries to show no sympathy, Schranz's team mates were no more sympathetic to Schranz either. Commenting on the public demonstrations in Austria against the US and Japanese embassies which had erupted after the dismissal, the ex-ski racer Toni Sailer understood the situation from the athletes' perspective: "Our skiers have trained for years to win a medal. They are not going to give up the chance now."[53] Austrian female star of the day, Annemarie Proel was even more outspoken: '"How can they speak of solidarity,' she said, 'when Schranz has never contributed any solidarity to the Austrian team."'[54] Thus, in terms of Olympic spirit, both issues of amateurism and fair play and understanding among competitors were openly discussed in the Schranz case, further showing the evidence of the crisis within the Olympic movement and ideals it still sought to preserve.

Redifining Olympic amateurism

Soon after the Sapporo games Schranz, in a widely published letter to Karl-Heinz Klee, the president of the Austrian Ski Federation, announced his retirement. What tipped the scales was the broken promise by the FIS for not holding separate world championships in 1972 despite it had originally promised to do so. In addition, Schranz was hardly pleased with the FIS stand that he should sue the company which had used his photo for advertisements. According to Schranz, he did not want to end his career in such polemics which only furthered the idea of skiing as a game of international politics of sport.[55]

After the Sapporo games, it was not only Schranz who retired but also Brundage stepped down from his 20-year-long IOC presidency, to be replaced by the Irish (soon-to-be) Lord Killanin. According to John Fry, the Sapporo incident was "a watershed in event in the history of the Olympics." It represented anything but the return to the amateur ideal.[56] The IOC and the FIS found common ground to work with, as the Killanin-Hodler relationship was far more conciliatory than the Brundage-Hodler one. In the 1974 meeting in Vienna, the IOC modified its eligibility rules which were almost matching with the rules the FIS had demanded. The following modifications were made: year-round training and competing was allowed; competitors were allowed to be fully compensated for clothing, equipment and medical care; competitors were allowed to accept academic and technical scholarships; competitor's name, picture, or sports performance could be used for advertising, provided the money was paid directly to the national association of Olympic committee, and not to the individual. The result was as *Ski* magazine noted with some glee that "the guardians of the shrine of pure amateurism have discarded some of their vestal virginity."[57]

Naturally, it is difficult to say to what extent it was the polemics around Schranz that in fact caused the change as opposed to a whole larger context of change within sports at the time. According to Finnish sport historian Helge Nygren, the 1974 modifications did not represent sharp break with the past but were "cotton wrapped around barbed wire" since ideologically the IOC continued to stand for amateurism.[58] Still, commenting on the 1974 modifications, the skiing media, perhaps

unsurprisingly, attributed the change to Schranz. However, the skiing media also recognized that the liberalization of rules was one thing, but they were not banished, as Nygren also reminded. As the *Skiing* commented, at the end of the day "what an individual does for a living should be of no concern to anyone other than the athlete, God – and, perhaps, Internal Revenue."[59]The Finnish media, too, citing Killanin, attributed the changes in the eligibility code to Schranz whose "disqualification accelerated the discussion on the "eternal amateur question."[60] In contrast, in the mainstream American press, Schranz hardly figured as prominently as the motor for change. On discussing the changes to the eligibility code, the *New York Times* for example, only brought Schranz in the context of warning: "Lord Killanin waved a warning finger at skiing, referring to the Sapporo Games when the great Austrian, Karl Schranz, was sent packing […] and it is hoped, said Killanin, 'that with wisdom the new [code 26] will be obeyed.'"[61] Moreover, as Llewellyn and Gleaves have argued, the Vienna session "temporarily halted the tempest around amateurism": barring Schranz had contributed to the organization's negative image, but perhaps more importantly it was also the change within the IOC that led to the eventual transformation of the view on amateurism. The end of Brundage era of amateurism came final with the death of Hugh Weir in 1975, who was equally, if not more vigilant in upholding the idea of amateurism than Brudage himself.[62]

Conclusion

To conclude, the Schranz incident no doubt helped to pave the way towards the gradual relaxation of the amateurism. The incident underscored the fact that large public considered the whole Olympic movement antiquated, undemocratic and out of touch with the realities of modern life. Also, as far as the eligibility rule was concerned, the changes in 1974 were close to the FIS' own eligibility rules which were worked out in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, after the Schranz incident, it still took more rounds of modifications, until in 1985 the article 26 was replaced with the athlete's code. Thus, in the larger context, the Schranz incident only served to highlight the problems which the IOC had not only over amateurism but over the changing nature of sports generally. With

the entry of TV and increasing commercialization, together with the Olympic movement's own financial struggles in the 1960s and 1970s, the Olympic movement was forced to renew itself and Schranz was perhaps a great symbolic catalyst for such renewal, highly visible but by itself hardly sufficient to force the change alone.

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